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THEOLOGIES OLD AND NEW
BY EDMUND NOBLE.
THE simplest view of purposiveness, relieved of every complication
and suited to the average mind of all ages, is that offered in the
Book of Genesis, according to which God, by an act of creative will,
called light into being, fashioned the earth and stars, gave rise on this
planet to all manner of living creatures, and finally made man "in
our image, after our likeness." Here was a conception which as-
sumed omnipotence without assuring omnipresence ; vaguely or
clearly, moreover, it involved either the thought of creation out of
nothing, or that of independent existence in the things "created."
But as men grew away from anthropomorphism the Almighty came
to be regarded as coextensive with the universe, now as identical with
things, or again as pervading them with the attributes of life, mind
and soul. Philosophical forms of pantheism have been in evidence
from the earliest: times. The process by which man projects con-
sciousness into the universe is seen already in Plato's "absolute idea,"
identified by him with God, and in his "world of ideas," of which
he regarded the world of sense as no more than a copy. Erom the
thought of the Stoics, who held that the universe is "a living being
of which God is the soul, the governing intelligence, the sovereign
law and the animating principle." it is not a far cry to Bruno's asser
tion of a "universal intelligence" or "indwelling reason" in nature.
Hegel (The Pliilosopky of History, Introduction) calls reason "the
substance of the universe" and "its infinite energy," further describ-
ing it as "the infinite complex of things, their entire essence and
truth" ; and Eechner's Ueber die Scclcnfrage, devoted to the thesis
that plants, the earth and the stars have souls, culminates in the
statement (p. 223) : "God is the All, or the soul of the All, accord-
ing as one wishes to understand it." Typical of many modern con-
ceptions of divine immanence is Isaac Newton's belief ("Optics")
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that the various portions of the world, organic and inorganic, "can
he the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill of a powerful,
ever-living Agent who, being in all places, is more able by his own
will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform sensorium, and
thereby to form and re-form the parts of the universe, than we are by
our own will to move the parts of our own bodies." Nearly two cen-
turies later Theodore Parker refashioned this definition in the words
:
"God, then, is universally present in the world of matter. He is the
substantiality of matter ... he fills all nature with his overflowing
currents ; without him it were not. His presence gives it existence ;
his will its law and force ; his wisdom its order ; his goodness its
beauty." Josiah Royce sought to show "the whole universe, includ-
ing the physical universe also, as essentially a living thing, a mind,
one Great Spirit." And Hyman Abbott wrote in TJie Theology of
an Evoliifioiiist: "I believe that the theology of the future will aftirm
that this Infinite and PIternal Energy is itself intelligent and benefi-
cent—an infinitely wise and holy Spirit dwelling within the universe
and shaping it from within, much as the human spirit dwells within
the human body and forms and controls it from within."
Between the earliest conceptions of a Deity external to the world
and the new teachings of Divine immanence human thought has fur-
nished teleologies of such protean forms as to make classication of
them well nigh impossible. Some of them take Deity for granted
;
others posit a "world soul" ; all seek to interpret the appearances of
"design in nature." The Greek hylozoists were convinced that mat-
ter has an original life principle which shows itself in both inorganic
and organic ; by Anaxagoras the purposiveness revealed in things is
referred to an ordering spirit or nous; Empedocles was content to
trace the movements of things to love as uniter and to hate as divider.
When the idea of the nous as cause and orderer was presented to
Socrates he commented : "If this be so, then the mind of the orderer
will dispose of all things and place each individual thing in such a
way as shall be for the best." Plato pictured a world of ends in
which the "divine Architect successively realizes his purpose through
the plastic action of the Idea, the absolute good, against the obstruc-
tive opposition of matter." The conception of a divine nous reap-
pears in Aristotle, who attributed life to a creative purpose," and in
his doctrine of the "entelechy" asserted that organisms differ from
inorganic bodies in that they are impelled by an internal principle, a
psyche, which employs a number of organs to realize its purpose."
To both organic and inorganic Hegel applied the formula of a "plas-
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tic instinct," an unconscious purposive activity (bczvussflose Zwcck-
thdtigkcit), which "acts without consciousness with a view to an end"
;
Hartmann held that matter consists of an inseparalile unity of will
and idea, and that atoms must he conceived of as wills or efforts, as
having "an unconscious idea" of their destiny in order to be able to
realize it. It was the belief of Kant that mechanism fully explains
the inorganic world, but he recognized the need of a teleological view
for anatomy, physiology and biology. "It is impossible," he wrote,
"to find in nature grounds for an explanation of nature, and we are
compelled by the constitution of our intellectual faculty to seek for
the supreme ground of teleological connection in an original intelli-
gence as cause of the world."
Modern assertions of an intelligent purpose at work in the uni-
verse shade off into assertions of purposiveness in the organism, but
in neither application is there any real attempt to meet the problem
with a solution. The so-called definitions of life have descriptive,
but no explanator}^ value. How are vital processes elucidated by
Bichat's "sum total of the forces that resist death," by Beclard's "or-
ganization in action," De Blainville's "two-fold movement of com-
position, at once general and continuous," or by G. H. Lewes's "series
of definite and successive changes, both of structure and composition,
which take place within an individual without destroying its identity ?"
Nor is explanation furthered by reversion to such vague concep-
tions as the "pJiysis" of Hippocrates, the "arcJicciis niaxhnus" of
Paracelsus, the "Bildungstrieh" or "nisus-formativus" of Blumen-
bach, Johann Muller's "organic force," Cudworth's "plastic nature,"
Hegel's "Trich der Perfcctihilitdt," Niigeli's "Vervollkomnmngsprin-
zip" or "tendency to progressive development," Bischoff's "peculiar
and individual cause or force which creates and shapes the whole
body," the "genetic energy" of Williams, Henslow's "property of
self-adaptation," or Moore's "bathmic energy." Just as unavailing
is Lester F, Ward's effort to explain vital characters from the ad-
vance in complexity which matter makes by becoming organic.
"From the molecule of hydrogen to that of albumen," he wrote {The
Status of the Mind Problem), "the process of evolution has been
uniformly the same, viz., that of compounding and recom_pounding,
of doubly and multiply compounding; in short, it has been the pro-
cess of molecular aggregation. With still higher states of aggrega-
tion, therefore, we should naturally expect still higher forms of ac-
tivity, still more marked properties." And he is more explicit still,
adding
: "The general truth is that chemical union results in a new
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substance with new properties, differing from and of a higher order
than those of any which have united to produce it. When the high-
est known chemical compounds still further combine we ought there-
fore to look for something remarkable. Where the largest molecules
whose constitution can be determined in a laboratory form themselves
into higher molecular systems we should not be surprised if the re-
sultant substance should be an extremely strange and important one.
The activities of all substances up to this point are molecular, but it
might well be that the new compound should possess molar activities."
This is plainly an arithmetical or multiplication-table theory of vital
phenomena. It means that you have only to go on compounding
and recompounding inorganic units to see life finally emerge. It im-
plies also the wonderful things which might happen were the com-
plexity to be still further increased.
F. A. Lange. in his "GcscJiichtc dcs Matcrialismus" (p. 581)
writes of "the mystical domination of the part by the whole," with the
remark that "little can be done with that." The vitalists have tried to
do much with it, and vitalism has had a long history, with distinc-
tions only loosely maintained between the notion of a psychical prin-
ciple in the organism and that of a "vital force" totally unlike force
in the inorganic. It was the "vital" kind of force which Claude
Bernard called "creative" : "Cc qui est essentiellement du domaine
de la vie, et cc qui napparticnt ni a la physique, ni a la chimie, ni
a rien autre chose, c'cst I'idcc dircctrice dc cctte evolution vitale."
Schopenhauer, who projected "will" into nature, tells us in his
"Parerga uiid Paralipomena" that the denial of vital force is absurd
:
"It is not disputed that physical and chemical forces are at work in
the organism, but that which holds them together and guides them,
so that the organism comes into being and subsists, that is vital force."
For Lionel Beale {Protoplasm) life is "a peculiar force temporarily
associated with matter," a "power capable of directing and control-
ling both matter and force," "an undiscovered form of force having
no connection with primary energy or motion," "some directing
agency of a kind peculiar to the living world." By Hans Driesch
{The History and Tlieory of Vitalism) a return is made to the "en-
telechy," described as "an agent sui generis, non-material and non-
spatial, but acting "into space, so to speak." also as a "psychoid" or
kind of potentiality or power not present in inorganic bodies. But
the inconsistencies and contradictions of vitalism find their complet-
est representation in Henri Bergson (Creative Evolution) , who reads
psychism into nature with a naivete almost passing belief. For him
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there are two forms of existence—matter and consciousness, with
their origin traced to some common source: matter, defined as a
"reversal" of consciousness, a thing that continually unmakes itself
and wears out" ; consciousness described as "action that continually
creates and multiplies." It is asserted that there is a "universal life"
with which "consciousness must be coextensive," and that life appears
by the action of consciousness upon "inert matter." life being defined
as consciousness launched into matter" ; for whatever vital characters
show themselves "it is as if a broad current of consciousness had
penetrated matter" and "carried matter along to organization." Life
is "like a current passing from germ to germ through the medium of
a developed organism" ; there is "an original impetus, an internal
push, that has carried life, by more and more complex forms, to
higher and higher destinies." More specifically, we are assured that
"at a certain point of space a visible current has taken rise; this
current of life, traversing the bodies it has organized one after
another, has become divided amongst species and distributed amongst
individuals without losing anything of its force, rather intensifying in
proportion to its advance." Bergson rejects what he calls "both ra-
dical mechanism and radical finalism." asserting that his philosophy,
"like radical finalism,, though in a vaguer form," represents the or-
ganized world as a harmonious whole. But beyond these highly
generalized statements, which assume without elucidation of them the
very modes of action to be explained, he makes no approach to a
teleology that can be reconciled with the deliverances of science, with
modern nature knowledge, or with the requirements of that common
sense which, confronted with any machine-like apparatus realizing
ends, insists on knowing "how it works." How it can be true that
"there are no things, there are only actions," and at the same time
true that there is an "inert matter" to be invaded and carried on to
organization is not revealed by the theory? The asserted grip of
consciousness of matter, each of them treated as unlike the other by
a total difiference of kind, is a manifest confusion of psychic with
dynamic values. Nor does the notion of a "vital impetus" as the
cause of life advance the explanation of purposiveness in the organ-
ism In' a single stage: to attribute vital phenomena to an clan vital is
like saying that the organism is alive because it has l)een vitalized.
And the interpretation of reality as "unceasing life, action, freedom,"
as "a ceaseless upspringing of something new," is a manifest denial
of the determinisms and repetitions which are essential to the order
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we behold in the cosmos, and from which the only freedom possible to
us as human beings can flow.
There is approach to a dynamico-chemical explanation of evolu-
tion in Herbert Spencer's system of thought, but no suggestion of a
specific purposiveness in nature finally attaining to more complete
manifestation in life: it is as if the author of First Principles were
so sure of the utter lack of anything like a teleology in things that
—
except for a vigorous repudiation of vitalistic hypotheses—he did not
even see the necessity of denying its existence. His doctrine of a
general world drift towards "equilibration" recalls Fechner's "ten-
dency to stability," yet by neither author is the conception worked
out to its "purposive" implications. For Spencer all forms and
configurations that arise in the material universe are due to the per-
sistence of force, to the transformation of the relatively homogeneous
into the relatively heterogeneous, to the "multiplication of effects"
and to processes of integration and segregation culminating in equili-
brium. He describes living aggregates as being "distinguished by the
connected facts that during integration the}^ undergo very remarkable
secondary changes which other aggregates do not undergo to any
considerable extent, and that they contain (bulks being supposed
equal) immensely greater quantities of motion locked up in various
ways." It is further stated that "all vital actions, considered not
separately, but in their ensemble, have for their final purpose the bal-
ancing of certain outer processes by certain inner processes. There
are unceasing external forces tending to bring the matter of which
organic bodies consist into that state of stable equilibrium displayed
by inorganic bodies; there are internal forces by which this tendency
is constantly antagonized ; and the perpetual changes which constitute
life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the antagon-
ism."
It is here implied in a round-about way that the organism is en-
gaged in maintaining itself, but when life is to be explained, rather
than merely described, Mr. Spencer contents himself with calling it
'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"
thus placing his emphasis on a subordinate detail which has many
analogues in inorganic processes, and which takes no account of the
fact that the organism man, to say nothing of the lower animals, has
been engaged from human beginnings in adjusting external relations
to internal relations. How an organic aggregate which dififers from
one that is inorganic in having "immensely greater quantities of mo-
tion locked up in various ways" comes unconsciously to fashion its
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own organs as man fashions his tools ^\r. Spencer nowhere states.
There is a further surrender of the need for explanation in the po-
siting of "very complex molecules," forming an "extremely change-
able substance" naturally "exix)sed to those innumerable modifica-
tions of conditions which the earth's surface afiforded," and yielding
under "the mutual influence of its metamorphic forms under favoring
conditions . . . the still more sensitive, still more variously change-
able portions of organic matter, which, in masses more minute than
existing protozoa, displayed actions varying little by little into those
called vital." For this view it is because of the molecular instability
of organic matter, because its structure becomes more "heterogene-
ous," because under the stress of incident forces it obeys the law of
the "multiplication of eiTects," not because the svstem is purposive
from the beginning, that by means of successive integrations and
differentiations the life functions arise and organs are developed.
Empty of both causal and genetic meaning is the passage which de-
fines " the structural complexity accompanying functional equilibra-
tion" as "one in which there are as many specialized parts as are
capable separately and jointly of counteracting the separate and
joint forces amid which the organism exists" ; it ignores, moreover,
the elementary fact that a large part of the activities of organisms is
expended, not merely in counteracting, but also in utilizing external
forces. And though Spencer came near an important purposive
factor in his account of motion as following "the line of greatest
traction, or the line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two,"
his application of the principle is made, not to the process by which
organs are originally set up, but only to organic development in gen-
eral especially to shapes taken and movements carried on after the
organs have been formed.
One of the most recent efforts to explain the teleology of the
organism is that of L. T. Hobhouse in Dcvclopuicnt and Purpose.
Its author fully recognizes the "mutual determination of parts" which
"must run through Reality as a whole." and is therefore led "to con-
ceive of Reality either as being a system of parts which necessitate
one another, or as being a collocation determined by such system."
(P. 348). He is explicit also in defining the difference between in-
organic and organic bodies, the one class made up of relatively in-
dependent units, the other of units dependent on the character of the
system. But despite frequent reference to the reqtiirements of the
whole, we get no real recognition of the directing power of the total
system from organic beginnings. An "unfinished window" is also
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left in the account of heredity : "what must exist at the beginning
is not the developed structure in miniature, but rather something that
will seize on all that comes within its grip and throw it into place in
such fashion that bit by bit the structure will grow." (P. 369).
There is here no identification of the "something," and no explana-
tion of the actual process of growth. And for the universe at large,
as for the organism in particular, Mr. Hobhouse's "purpose" is
plainly psychical, based on the consciousness implied in human de-
sign—not dynamical, founded in the nature of cosmic power. "The
evolutionary process," he writes, "can best be understood as the
effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting condi-
tions which it brings successively under control . . . This would
mean, not that Reality is spiritual or the creation of an unconditional
mind
. . . but that there is a spiritual element integral to the struc-
ture and movement of Reality, and that evolution is the process by
which this principle makes itself master of the residual conditions
which at first dominate its life and thwart its efforts." And he yet
more plainly allies himself with the psychomorphists, first by in-
ferring "a power of the nature of mind operating under conditions
towards the effectuation of a world-purpose," then by asserting ex-
plicitly that "there is a mind of which the world-purpose is the ob-
ject," and that "such a mind must be a permanent and central factor
in the process of Reality." But "how in detail its relation to Reality
in general and the individual mind in particular is to be conceived is
a question about which it is best frankly to confess ignorance."
The clearest trail in the direction of a reasonable cosmic teleology
offered by those who do not undertake to formulate one is that recent-
ly indicated by Lawrence J. Henderson of Harvard University in his
masterly account of TJw Fitiicss of flic Enviromnent. The aim of
the book is to show that life could not arise or the organism be main-
tained without the suitable materials that occur and the favoring
processes which go on in the general inorganic surroundings—that, in
a word, as there is a fitness of the living body to the environment, so
there is a complementary fitness of the environment to the organism.
But this theory does not mean, as in some attempted utilizations of it,
that the environment was so ordered in its powers and contents that
living beings would necessarily come forth. If after water has been
poured down the side of a rock and allowed to freeze as it goes the
spear of ice could be raised and examined it would be found to repre-
sent all the sinuosities and protuberances of the stony surface into
which it had fitted itself ; but this would not mean that the rock had
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been shaped so as to give rise to those particular conformations. A
burning candle requires a fit environment, with oxygen in it, yet there
is no need to conclude that the atmospheric conditions were de-
signed with the production of flame in view. For the functioning of
an umbrella there are required a human being, the earth and a whole
set of meteorological factors ; yet we are not bound to devise a tele-
ological explanation of even that manifest environmental fitness.
Otherwise, and in all such cases, we should have to make the false
assumption that the results observed are inevitable, and that the
causes have been so ordered as to produce them, instead of the true
assumption that from such causes the observed results proceed, and
that with other causes in operation the results would be different.
Prof. Henderson, of course, draws no teleological conclusion of the
conventional type from the '"fitness of the environment," but he
points the way to a rational theory on the subject when he asserts
"that the properties of matter and the course of cosmic evolution are
now seen to be intimately related to the structure of the living being
and to its activities, and that they become far more important in
biology than has hitherto been suspected" . . . "that the process of
cosmic evolution is indissolubly linked with the fundamental charac-
teristics of the organism, and that in some obscure manner cosmical
and biological evolution are one."
Recognition of some kind of purposiveness in nature is thus an
enduring element of human thought. Beginning with the ancients,
it has survived the negations of materialism and the fortuities of nat-
ural selection ; for our own time it recurs in vitalism and finds dis-
tinct reverberation in the biological doctrine of orthogenesis. Yet
none of the teleologies or half-teleologies of the past, whether relig-
ious, philosophical or scientific, supply us with the explanation we
need. The method followed in the most typical of them is to refer
the appearances of "design" to some general entity or principle, and
use that as the cause of the phenomena to be explained, but without
effort to trace its operation step by step through the action to the
effect. Many of the "solutions" offered are founded on man's well-
nigh ineradicable tendency to read into the universe and its processes
the life, will, consciousness or personality—sometimes all these
—
which he finds in himself. Where the principle invoked is psychic,
the theorist sets consciousness, the latest arrival, at the beginning of
things, but fails to show how mind can emerge for knowing and di-
rective functions from a power system which is manifestly pre-
organic; where the appeal is made to a universally diffused will he
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commits the parallel yet more radical absurdity of positing life in
advance of the only conditions that can make life possible. Too
often, even in biological hypotheses, organic purposiveness is re-
garded as a new appearance in nature, as unlinked with any more
elementary purposiveness in the inorganic. A vast amount of cur-
rent reasoning about evolution proceeds on the assumption that tele-
ological questions, being pertinent only to the realms of metaphysics
and religion, can be safely ignored ; much recent discussion in biology
takes for granted that the issue regarding purposiveness in the or-
ganic is outside the purview of science. The specialist who studies
vital phenomena is mainly concerned with the complications which
life displays after it has appeared—with germ-plasm, heredity and
the "Mendelian factors" ; with details of cell development, with the
manner in which the organism adapts itself to changes of environ-
ment, with the inheritance or non-inheritance of "acquired charac-
ters," and with the multifarious facts which bear on the "origin of
species," as if none of the conclusions reached in these fields needed
the buttressing of some radical insight into the meaning of life itself.
And philosophy, which should realize that purposiveness is the funda-
mental problem in all nature study, busies itself more and more with
the superstructure, lavishing its powers on the theory of knowledge,
on the relation between mind and body, and on such sub-topics as
pluralism, pragmatism and neo-realism. Needful as is work in these
fields, it should not surprise that some of our modern teleologies are
seen raising subjectivism to the ;7-th power, or succeeding only as
contributions to the romance of metaphysics.
